Stuck in the moment: cognitive inflexibility in preschoolers following an extended time period by Carolina Garcia & Anthony Steven Dick
“fpsyg-04-00959” — 2013/12/20 — 17:21 — page 1 — #1
ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE
published: 24 December 2013
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00959
Stuck in the moment: cognitive inﬂexibility in preschoolers
following an extended time period
Carolina Garcia and Anthony Steven Dick*
Department of Psychology, Florida International University, Miami, FL, USA
Edited by:
Nicolas Chevalier, University of
Colorado Boulder, USA
Reviewed by:





Anthony Steven Dick, Department of
Psychology, Florida International
University, Modesto A. Maidique
Campus AHC-4 454, 11200 S.W.
8th Street, Miami, FL 33199, USA
e-mail: adick@ﬁu.edu
Preschoolers display surprising inﬂexibility in problem solving, but seem to approach new
challenges with a fresh slate.We provide evidence that while the former is true the latter is
not. Here, we examined whether brief exposure to stimuli can inﬂuence children’s problem
solving following several weeks after ﬁrst exposure to the stimuli. We administered a
common executive function task, the Dimensional Change Card Sort, which requires
children to sort picture cards by one dimension (e.g., color) and then switch to sort the
same cards by a conﬂicting dimension (e.g., shape). After a week or after a month delay,
we administered the second rule again. We found that 70% of preschoolers continued to
sort by the initial sorting rule, even after a month delay, and even though they are explicitly
told what to do. We discuss implications for theories of executive function development,
and for classroom learning.
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INTRODUCTION
Young children appear to pick up new knowledge with ease,
but they display equally surprising inﬂexibility in problem solv-
ing situations. No better evidence for this exists than observing
children’s performance on a now-classic task, the Dimensional
Change Card Sort (DCCS; Frye et al., 1995; Zelazo et al., 2003;
Zelazo, 2006). In this task, children sort picture cards ﬁrst by
one dimension (e.g., color), and then by a second conﬂict-
ing dimension (e.g., shape). Even though they are told exactly
what to do (e.g., “Put the blue ones here and the yellow ones
there”), when the rule changes (e.g., “Put the dogs here and
the boats there”), younger preschoolers perseverate and sort
by the initial rule. What remains unclear is whether this is a
transient effect, or whether preschoolers who encounter con-
ditions of conﬂict in a problem solving situation will carry
with them the effects of that experience to the same prob-
lem solving situation if it occurs again in the more distant
future.
Such an investigation must begin with an examination of why
young children have difﬁculty with such an easy task. Several
authors have focused on the processes that are called upon to
overcome interference from the initial task set in the immediate
context. For example, Frye et al. (1995) and Zelazo et al. (1996)
proposed a Cognitive Complexity and Control (CCC) theory
suggesting that in such task-switching situations children must
organize the conﬂicting task rules into a hierarchical structure and
apply that structure to determine which is the appropriate rule
to use in the present context. This places a demand on working
memory (Halford et al., 1998; Zelazo et al., 2003). Others suggest
that, when the rule changes, children must inhibit attention to fea-
tures of the object that were previously relevant in the immediate
past, but are now irrelevant after the rule switch (Kirkham et al.,
2003; Diamond and Kirkham, 2005; Diamond et al., 2005). This is
proposed to require mature inhibitory control over the immediate
context.
These theories, however, remain agnostic about how processes
of working memory and inhibition interface with long term mem-
ory of prior experiences with the objects under study. In the
laboratory setting this is less relevant because the stimuli used
to study task-switching are often novel for the children. How-
ever, in everyday problem solving situations encountered in school
and home learning settings, because it is cost-prohibitive to reg-
ularly replace the teaching tools, preschoolers often encounter
objects repeatedly over the course of the school year. For exam-
ple, preschool children might learn to categorize blocks or toys
by their shape when they are learning shape categories, and
they might then move on to learn to categorize those same
objects by color. The theoretical accounts just described sug-
gest that, in order to shift to categorize the objects by color,
children would have to recruit additional cognitive resources
(whether working memory or inhibitory control) to consider the
same objects under a different category. However, these theories
make no predictions about whether the children would have to
recruit these additional resources if they encountered the objects
several weeks or months after the initial experience with the
objects.
Work with adults suggests that they would, and that (1)
tasks carry their history with them and when task stimuli are
faced again there is a re-establishment of the previous task set;
(2) stimuli acquire associations with the tasks in which they occur;
(3) facing the same stimuli in different tasks produces cognitive
costs; (4) these effects can be detected even after long interven-
ing time periods (Waszak et al., 2003). Additional theoretical and
empirical research on memory and priming in children also sug-
gests that children in such settings would encounter what amounts
to a task-switching situation, even if the initial encounter with the
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objects occurred many weeks before. For example, from a the-
oretical perspective such a prediction would likely ﬁt within an
active-latent connectionist account of children’s performance on
theDCCS. Thismodel draws a distinction between differentmem-
ory systems that are presumably engaged in tasks like the DCCS:
a slow, “latent” memory system implemented in the form of con-
nections between processing units, established over time during
the pre-switch phase of the DCCS, and a fast “active”memory sys-
tem implemented in the form of units capable of self-sustaining
activity (Munakata, 2001; Morton and Munakata, 2002; Blackwell
et al., 2009). The continued interference of the pre-switch dimen-
sion would be predicted under this model if the latent memory
traces persist for long periods of time (Yerys and Munakata, 2006).
The prediction could also be made under the revised CCC
theory (CCC-r; Zelazo et al., 2003; Müller et al., 2006), which
speciﬁes that negative priming of the irrelevant dimension during
the pre-switch phase contributes to difﬁculty in the post-switch
phase. Negative priming describes the disruption or slowing of
a response to a stimulus that has previously been ignored (Fox,
1995; May et al., 1995). Applied to the DCCS, the theory sug-
gests that during the pre-switch phase there is suppression or
inhibition of the competing distractor (negative priming) such
that when the distractor stimuli become relevant in the post-
switch, the previous suppression must be overcome by application
of a higher-order rule. Early theories of negative priming sug-
gested that inhibition of the competing distractor was a transient
effect (Tipper, 1985; Neill and Westberry, 1987). However, prim-
ing effects of seemingly innocuous stimuli are known to occur
after months (Sloman et al., 1988; Maylor, 1998) and even years
(Mitchell, 2006), even in preschool children (Drummey and New-
combe, 1995), and subsequent research has shown that negative
priming effects can also last a considerable amount of time
(Tipper, 2001 for review). For example, DeSchepper and Treis-
man (1996) observed negative priming in a selective attention task
in adults after 1 month between the presentation of the prime
and the subsequent presentation of the probe. This suggests that
the memory traces formed even within a single experience with
an object can last at full strength across several weeks of tem-
poral delay. If negative priming contributes to difﬁculty on the
DCCS, it would be expected that the initial experience with the
stimulus properties would still contribute to interference weeks
later.
There is evidence that negative priming affects performance
on the DCCS over short delays of 10 min (Müller et al., 2006),
but these ﬁndings provide only initial evidence that children
continue to “swim against the current” if they previously encoun-
tered a problem and failed to solve it, even if that encounter
occurred in the more distant past. If the effects are found to
be very long lasting, it would have implications for understand-
ing mechanisms underlying children’s cognitive inﬂexibility, and
it would also have implications for how parents and teachers
structure problem solving situations in education settings. That
is, if the same materials are used to teach conﬂicting concepts,
such a ﬁnding would suggest that some concept learning sit-
uations can actually require additional cognitive resources to
overcome interference from the prior processing episode. Fur-
ther, this might be the case even if the initial experience with
the event was brief, and occurred several weeks or months in the
past.
To investigate this issuemore thoroughly,we examinedwhether
even brief exposure to stimuli can inﬂuence problem solving fol-
lowing a signiﬁcant intervening time after the ﬁrst exposure. We
administered a second post-switch phase to the DCCS following
either a week or a month delay. Based on the priming literature we
have reviewed, we predicted that the initial experience would have
long-term effects on children’s cognitive ﬂexibility.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
We tested sixty-two3–5-year-old children (M = 4.0 y; SD= 0.58 y)
from Miami-Dade, FL, USA preschools. Half participated in one
of two conditions (1 week and 1 month), and did not differ on
age across conditions, t(60) = −0.215, p = 0.83. Children were
bilingual and were tested in their dominant language (assessed
by parent questionnaire and veriﬁed by pretest; nine children were
veriﬁed only by pretest). Bilingualismhas been related to improved
cognitive ﬂexibility on the DCCS (Bialystok, 1999). We restricted
the study to bilingual children because the majority of children in
Miami-Dade preschools are bilingual, and we wanted to maintain
homogeneity of the sample on this factor. Testing took place in the
preschools. To control for possible effects of context, testing took
place in the same location for all phases of the task.
GENERAL DESIGN
The design was a between subjects design with Delay (1 week and
1 month) as a single factor with two levels.
We followed Zelazo (2006), with the exception that we added
a second post-switch phase following the ﬁrst post-switch, after
either 1 week or 1 month. We used two target cards (e.g., blue
dog and yellow boat) and 10 test cards (e.g., yellow dogs and blue
boats). Children were randomly assigned to sort by either color or
shape ﬁrst, and this was not associated with task success, Fisher’s
exact p = 0.10.
We attached one target card to each of the trays. We explained
the rules for the pre-switch phase (e.g., “All the yellow ones go
here, and all the blue ones go there.”) and the child watched as
the ﬁrst practice trial was sorted. We then asked the child to sort
a card, and we provided feedback to make sure they understood
the instructions. We proceeded to the pre-switch phase and asked
the children to sort the remaining eight cards and place them face
down into the tray. On each trial, children were reminded of the
rules and asked “Here’s a (e.g., yellow one), where does this go
in the (e.g., color) game?” After eight trials, we administered the
post-switch rules – e.g., “Now we are going to play a new game.
We are not going to play the color game anymore. We are going
to play the shape game. In the shape game, all the dogs go here,
and all the boats go there.” Children then sorted eight post-switch
trials.
We returned to the school after an intervening period of either
1 week or 1 month. Here we only presented one set of rules identi-
cal to those given in the post-switch phase in the initial encounter.
For each trial, we repeated the rule, but no feedback was given.
We administered knowledge questions after the post-switch phase
(Zelazo et al., 1996).
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Table 1 | Pass–fail rates for the first and second post-switch phases for




Post-switch Pass 19 0





Post-switch Pass 14 0
Time 1 Fail 6 11
Total 20 11
RESULTS
Passing was deﬁned as sorting four or more (out of eight cards)
correctly. Consistent with prior work on the DCCS (Zelazo et al.,
2003), the majority of children (90%) sorted correctly either all
the cards, or none of the cards. All children included in analysis
passed the pre-switch phase and answered the knowledge ques-
tions correctly. We ﬁrst established that the groups did not differ
at the ﬁrst visit. Of the 31 children in each group, 12 failed the ﬁrst
post-switch for the 1-week delay condition, and 17 failed the ﬁrst
post-switch for the 1-month delay condition. These failure rates
did not differ across condition, Fisher’s exact p = 0.37, which indi-
cates that the pre-post differences we report after the delay cannot
be attributed to differences between groups during the ﬁrst visit.
Of primary interest was whether the delay would help respond-
ing. This was tested separately for both conditions, with the
null hypothesis that the passing rates for the ﬁrst and second
post-switch phases would be equal. The pass–fail rates for each
condition are given in Table 1. For the week condition, 9 of 12
(75%) of children who failed the ﬁrst post-switch also failed the
second, McNemar χ2(31) = 1.33, p = 0.25, suggesting no signif-
icant difference in passing rate after the week delay. Speciﬁcally,
only 25% of children beneﬁted from the delay of 1 week. For
the month condition, fewer children failed. Speciﬁcally, 11 of 17
(65%) failed both post-switch phases, McNemar χ2(31) = 4.17,
p = 0.04, which shows a signiﬁcant beneﬁt for the month delay.
Thus, 35% of children passed the second post-switch after fail-
ing the ﬁrst post-switch. However, the result must be interpreted
within the context that only a minority of children in either condi-
tion beneﬁted from the delay. In fact, a large percentage of children
(70% across conditions) who failed the ﬁrst post-switch also failed
the second after a considerable intervening time period.
DISCUSSION
We administered the DCCS with a second post-switch following
either a week or a month delay. We showed that while a long
delay of 1 month was sufﬁcient to facilitate shifting to the novel
dimension on the DCCS, even with this considerable intervening
time period, 65% of children still failed to pass the task. While
it is remarkable to observe young children’s difﬁculty with the
standard DCCS, our results extend this well-known ﬁnding to
demonstrate that even brief exposure to simple stimuli can have
a marked effect on children’s success in simple problem solving
situations many weeks later. As we discuss, these ﬁndings have
implications for theories of developing cognitive ﬂexibility (Garon
et al., 2008; Cragg and Chevalier, 2012) and for problem solving
situations in educational settings.
Theoretically, two models proposed to explain performance on
the DCCS can be affected by our ﬁndings because they propose
processes that could potentially change, in terms of their inﬂuence
on performance, over the delay period. The ﬁrst are models that
emphasize the role of priming and negative priming in developing
cognitive ﬂexibility (Allport and Wylie, 2000; Zelazo et al., 2003;
Müller et al., 2006; Chevalier and Blaye, 2008). In particular, there
is growing evidence that negative priming contributes to children’s
difﬁculty on the DCCS (Zelazo et al., 2003; Müller et al., 2006)
and on similar set-shifting tasks (Chevalier and Blaye, 2008; Dick,
2012). Further, these negative priming effects can be detected after
only one or two conﬂicting stimulus presentations, and persist
over a 10-min intervening time period (Müller et al., 2006; Exper-
iment 4). Work with adults suggests that negative priming is not
transient and can actually persist over a considerable time period
(DeSchepper and Treisman, 1996), but until now this has not been
shown in children. Our results connect well with the adult data in
this respect, showing that negative priming of the irrelevant values
may still inﬂuence theproblemsolving situation after severalweeks
(Tipper, 2001). However, the possibility that our results reﬂect the
effects of prior negative priming would have to be conﬁrmed, as it
is possible that the ﬁndings could also be explained by interference
from the previously relevant stimulus values (Kirkham et al., 2003;
Chevalier and Blaye, 2008; Dick, 2012).
A second model of DCCS performance, the “active-latent”
model, can also incorporate the ﬁndings we present here. As
we reviewed in the Introduction, applied to the DCCS, the
active-latent model proposes that ﬂexible behavior is under-
stood in terms of the relative strengths of “active” and “latent”
memory traces (Munakata, 2001; Morton and Munakata, 2002;
Blackwell et al., 2009). These memory traces are proposed to be
graded in terms of the strength of the representation, and fur-
ther are established over time during the pre-switch phase of the
DCCS. Applied to this model, our data suggest that the latent
memory trace is quite resilient in the face of considerable expo-
sure to the stimulus values (e.g., yellow and blue) in other settings.
In other words, encountering the stimulus values in another set-
ting does not appear to “break the bond”between those particular
values and the values with which they are associated during the
pre-switch phase of the DCCS (e.g., boats and dogs).
The ﬁndings also ﬁt well with models proposed for adults
in task-switching situations, which suggest that tasks carry their
history, and can elicit switch costs when the stimuli from the
previous task are encountered in a different task (Waszak et al.,
2003). The robust inﬂuence, even after long delays, of prior expe-
rience with the speciﬁc stimulus may be attributed to the retrieval
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of “event-bindings” comprised of the object-task-action feature
associations of the initial experience (Allport and Wylie, 2000;
Zmigrod and Hommel, 2013). Research shows that even repeating
parts of a previous feature combination can lead to the retrieval
of all components of that combination (Kahneman et al., 1992;
Hommel, 2004 for review). For example, functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have shown that repeating a
particular stimulus feature reactivates areas of the brain involved
in both the representation of that feature and the representation
of features that co-occurred with that feature. Thus, Keizer et al.
(2008) showed that, if presented after a subject perceives a face
moving across the screen in a particular direction, seeing a house
move in that same direction will activate areas of cortex sensi-
tive to features of the house and the face, even though the face
is not immediately present. Kühn et al. (2011) further showed
that this binding affect applies to the response as well. That is,
they showed that repeating a stimulus feature leads to the neural
activation of regions involved in the response, and reactivation
of regions involved in a different stimulus feature that accompa-
nied the response. Some evidence suggests that combining features
(e.g., shape and location) in memory is less efﬁcient in children
(Lorsbach and Reimer, 2005; Cowan et al., 2006), but our data
suggest that, even if this is the case, the binding is adequate
enough to affect problem solving after a long intervening time
period.
Event- or feature-binding during problem solving facilitates
rapid responding to stimuli that are experienced again in the
future, but this is beneﬁcial only if the task remains the same.
If the task changes, especially if it conﬂicts with the previ-
ous task and uses the same objects, it will lead to interference
and reduced facilitation. One can readily see how this would
be relevant to educational settings. If this binding is as robust
as our data imply, using the same objects to emphasize a par-
ticular concept or stimulus feature would be beneﬁcial if the
concept or stimulus feature is the same, but would poten-
tially impede learning if the concept or stimulus feature is in
conﬂict with the previous learning episode. For example, if a
teacher or parent is trying to teach a preschooler the names
for shapes, it might impede learning if the same objects were
previously used to teach about colors because the previous
event-bindings would be recalled. Further, this could occur
long after the instructor would expect the child to remem-
ber the previous experience with the objects. It remains to be
determined how important this is in actual educational settings–
this requires additional research. However, at a minimum our
results should help educators understand the challenges that
preschoolers face beyond those that are apparent in the immediate
situation.
If these implications are valid, one can ask what steps can be
taken to minimize the interference effects of the prior task. One
option is corrective feedback, which is shown to have a signif-
icant inﬂuence on maintenance of correct responses in testing
situations (Bangert-Drowns et al., 1991 for review). This is partic-
ularly important in situations in which students make mistakes,
as persistence of incorrect responding is known to increase the
acquisition of false knowledge (Roediger and Marsh, 2005; Butler
et al., 2006). In these situations, feedback promotes the learning
of correct responses (Butler et al., 2008) and predicts better per-
formance on subsequent tests (McDaniel and Fisher, 1991; Butler
and Roediger, 2008).
The effects of feedback have been speciﬁcally assessed on tasks
assessing cognitive ﬂexibility such as the DCCS. One form of feed-
back is labeling of the dimensions, and a number of studies have
shown positive effects of labeling the relevant properties on chil-
dren’s performance on the DCCS (Towse et al., 2000; Kirkham
et al., 2003; Yerys and Munakata, 2006). However, both the timing
of the feedback, and the nature of the labeling, affects respond-
ing (Yerys and Munakata, 2006), and some researchers have failed
to ﬁnd a beneﬁcial effect of labeling on the DCCS (Müller et al.,
2008). Age-related change in response to feedback is also indicated
in tasks assessing cognitive ﬂexibility. In one study, Chevalier et al.
(2009)modeled the effects of feedback on an inductive task similar
to the DCCS. They showed that children’s responses are affected
differently by different kinds of feedback. For example, early in the
task children responded well to positive feedback for the relevant
color, but not negative feedback for the irrelevant colors. However,
this effect changes as the task proceeds through various phases of
dimensional shifts–that is, the response to feedback changes across
phases of the task. Chevalier et al. (2009) also showed that age
modulated feedback processing efﬁciency as children progressed
through the task. Such ﬁndings indicate that feedback provided
in situations that require cognitive ﬂexibility can have different
effects depending on the complexity of the task, how the feedback
relates to the prior experiences with the stimuli, and the age of the
child.
In summary, the study we report revealed a surprising ﬁnd-
ing – for preschoolers, even very brief exposure to conﬂicting
stimuli can inﬂuence the response to those stimuli if the prob-
lem solving situation is encountered again after a long intervening
time period. Evidence for the resilience of the initial repre-
sentation of the stimuli should be incorporated into existing
theoretical models of cognitive ﬂexibility. Further, the results
should inform future work on how to structure learning in educa-
tional settings where the available resources often require teaching
sometimes conﬂicting concepts using the same stimuli. Our data
suggest that even waiting a long time between learning opportu-
nities is insufﬁcient to “wash out” prior experience with the task
stimuli.
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